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An integration of existing research and newly conducted psychophysiological interaction
(PPI) connectivity analyses suggest a new framework for understanding the contribution
of midline regions to social cognition. Recent meta-analyses suggest that there are no
midline regions that are exclusively associated with self-processing. Whereas medial pre-
frontal cortex (MPFC) is broadly modulated by self-processing, subdivisions within MPFC
are differentially modulated by the evaluation of close others (ventral MPFC: BA 10/32)
and the evaluation of other social targets (dorsal MPFC: BA 9/32). The role of DMPFC in
social cognition may also be less uniquely social than previously thought; it may be better
characterized as a region that indexes certainty about evaluation rather than previously
considered social mechanisms (i.e., correction of self-projection). VMPFC, a region often
described as an important mediator of socioemotional significance, may instead perform a
more cognitive role by reflecting the type of information brought to bear on evaluations of
people we know well. Furthermore, the new framework moves beyond MPFC and hypoth-
esizes that two other midline regions, ventral anterior cingulate cortex (VACC: BA 25) and
medial orbitofrontal cortex (MOFC: BA 11), aid motivational influences on social cognition.
Despite the central role of motivation in psychological models of self-perception, neural
models have largely ignored the topic. Positive connectivity between VACC and MOFC
may mediate bottom-up sensitivity to information based on its potential for helping us
evaluate ourselves or others the way we want. As connectivity becomes more positive
with striatum and less positive with middle frontal gyrus (BA 9/44), MOFC mediates top-
down motivational influences by adjusting the standards we bring to bear on evaluations
of ourselves and other people.
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INTRODUCTION
The speculation that some midline regions contribute to self-
processing stems from research conducted over a decade ago (Beer
et al., 2006b). What have we learned since those initial stud-
ies found that medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is modulated
by encoding and remembering information in relation to the
self (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004; Ochsner et al.,
2005)? This article draws on existing research and newly con-
ducted psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses to describe
a new framework for the contribution of how a subportion of
midline regions to social cognition (see Figure 1). The new frame-
work builds on previous discussions by (a) positing a new role
for the MPFC in social cognition and (b) moving past the MPFC
to consider the importance of ventral anterior cingulate (VACC:
BA 25) and medial orbitofrontal cortex (MOFC: BA 11) in aiding
motivational influences on social cognition. Recent meta-analyses
suggests that there are no midline regions that are exclusively asso-
ciated with self-processing. For example, meta-analyses of studies
of social evaluation (i.e., traits, personal abilities, etc.) find that the
MPFC likely mediates psychological processes that are brought to
bear on self-evaluation but also evaluations of other kinds of peo-
ple (e.g., close others vs. non-close-others: Ochsner et al., 2005; Qin
and Northoff, 2011; Murray et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2012). Whereas
it was once thought that regions within VMPFC (BA 10/32) and
DMPFC (BA 9/32) mediated person evaluation through the cor-
rection of self-projection, there are a number of issues that must be
addressed before strong conclusions can be drawn. For example,
current research provides more consistent evidence for the role
DMPFC in certainty about self-evaluation even during tasks that
require evaluations of other people. Furthermore, recent research
suggests that VACC and MOFC are just as importantly involved in
social cognition as the MPFC. Neural models of social cognition
have not incorporated motivated processing which is a funda-
mental element of psychological models of the self (Beer, 2007).
A growing body of research suggests that motivational influences
on self- and other-evaluation are mediated by VACC and MOFC.
VACC may mediate bottom-up sensitivity to information based on
its potential for helping us evaluate ourselves or others the way we
want (Beer, 2012a). MOFC may mediate top-down motivational
influences on self-evaluation. Taken together, the new framework
highlights the progress that has been made over the past decade:
MPFC is involved in social cognition but does not mediate “self-
specific” processes and two additional regions, VACC and MOFC,
play an important role in motivated self- and other-evaluation.
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FIGURE 1 | A framework of cortical midline structures implicated in
self-evaluation. DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (BA 9, 32); VMPFC,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (BA 10, 32); VACC, ventral anterior cingulate
cortex (BA 25); MOFC, medial orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11, 12).
A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE ROLE OF MPFC IN
SOCIAL COGNITION: CERTAINTY IN EVALUATION?
While much has been learned about the role of MPFC in social cog-
nition in the past decade,much more remains to be known. A series
of studies in the early 2000s found that MPFC (BA 9/10/32) was
modulated by both self-evaluation and evaluations of a political
figure but modulation was greatest for self-evaluation (e.g., Kelley
et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004; Ochsner et al., 2005). This research
sparked interest in testing the possibility that functional MPFC
subdivisions distinguished self-processing from the evaluation of
other people. In contrast to this possibility, recent meta-analyses
have shown that MPFC (BA 9/10/32) modulation is not exclusive
to self; this region is modulated by both self-processing and pro-
cessing about other people (Ochsner et al., 2005; Qin and Northoff,
2011; Murray et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2012). Instead of a self vs. other
distinction,meta-analyses suggest a close other vs. non-close-other
distinction. A ventral subdivision of this MPFC region (BA: 10/32,
see Figure 1) is associated with self-processing and evaluations
of close others (Ochsner et al., 2005; Qin and Northoff, 2011;
Murray et al., 2012). A more dorsal subdivision (BA 9/32, see
Figure 1) is associated with self-processing and evaluations of
non-close-others (Ochsner et al., 2005; Qin and Northoff, 2011;
Murray et al., 2012). Therefore, the next step toward understanding
the contribution of MPFC to social cognition should be focused
on understanding the psychological significance of MPFC’s broad
association with self-processing in combination with the ventral
to dorsal differentiation of processing about other people.
DMPFC: CORRECTING SELF-PROJECTION OR CERTAINTY IN (SOCIAL)
JUDGMENT?
The correction of self-projection was one of the first psychologi-
cal processes hypothesized to explain DMPFC’s association with
both self-processing and processing of non-close-others. Psycho-
logical models suggest that one way we evaluate a new person is
through the correction of self-projection, that is, by drawing on
self-representation to the extent it is perceived as applicable to the
new person (i.e., assumed similarity: Nickerson, 1999; Epley et al.,
2004; Srivastava et al., 2010). Does DMPFC modulation reflect
the corrective adjustment processes that are engaged to the extent
that a new person is evaluated as dissimilar to the self? A different
mechanism is suggested by an examination of the broader role of
DMPFC in evaluation (including non-social evaluation) and psy-
chological models of the interrelation between self-evaluation and
evaluation of non-similar others. Specifically, DMPFC is associ-
ated with evaluation outside the social domain (Krain et al., 2006)
and has been implicated in greater certainty about an evaluation
(e.g., Krain et al., 2006; Bhanji et al., 2010). In contrast to the cor-
rection of self-projection hypothesis, it may be that certainty about
self-evaluation explains why MPFC is modulated by the degree to
which novel others are evaluated as different than the self.
Dissimilarity between the self and a novel person positively
modulates DMPFC activation
Studies have consistently found that DMPFC (BA 9/32) activa-
tion parametrically increases to the extent that a novel person
is evaluated as dissimilar to the self (Mitchell et al., 2005; Tamir
and Mitchell, 2010). For example, these studies ask participants to
report their own preferences (e.g.,“how much do you look forward
to going home for Thanksgiving?”) and to evaluate the preferences
of strangers. The strangers are often manipulated to vary in their
dissimilarity to the participant (e.g., have a different or similar
political orientation, gender, or race). When neural activation is
measured during the evaluation of strangers’ preferences, DMPFC
(BA 9/32) is parametrically modulated by the dissimilarity
between the participant’s own preferences and the preferences they
assign to the strangers (Mitchell et al., 2005; Tamir and Mitchell,
2010). In other words, the more participants evaluate the strangers
as dissimilar to themselves, the more DMPFC activation increases
when participants are evaluating the stranger’s preferences.
The robust association between DMPFC modulation and dis-
similarity between self and others has been theorized to reflect the
role of DMPFC (BA 9/32) in correcting, that is, adjusting one’s own
self-representation to estimate the experience of a stranger. This
explanation stems from psychological models of person evaluation
which suggest that people use themselves as a starting point and
correct as needed to evaluate unknown others (Nickerson, 1999;
Epley et al., 2004; Srivastava et al., 2010). So if you encounter
someone who shares your political orientation and you have to
evaluate their position on a particular issue, you are likely to use
your own experience to evaluate the person’s position. However,
if a new person does not share your political orientation, then you
cannot simply use your own experience and your evaluation will
likely correct for the extent to which the person differs in political
orientation (e.g., a liberal may feel that a self-representation might
partially apply to a stranger who is a moderate but not apply at all
to someone who is conservative).
Does MPFC modulation reflect a correction of self-projection
in social evaluation or is there another explanation that warrants
examination before a strong conclusion can be drawn? There are
a number of findings which raise the possibility that DMPFC
modulation may instead reflect greater certainty in evaluation
rather than correction of self-projection. For example, the pre-
vious studies have looked at DMPFC modulation during the eval-
uation of others. How does this compare to DMPFC modulation
during self-evaluation and is it consistent with a correction of self-
projection explanation? Meta-analyses find that DMPFC (DMPFC
is a label that is used in various ways in previous literature; the
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present article draws on published meta-analyses and uses the
term DMPFC as label for relevant portions of BA 9/32. Within BA
9, z ranges from 20 to 42 in MNI coordinates, see Figure 1) is acti-
vated by both self-processing and evaluations of other people not
personally known by the participant. In direction comparisons,
some meta-analyses find that this activation is relatively greater
for unknown others while other meta-analyses find no differ-
ence in this region’s activation for self-processing and evaluation
of unknown others (Self vs. Other comparison: Ochsner et al.,
2005; Qin and Northoff, 2011; Roy et al., 2012). If the DMPFC
reflects a correction of self-projection that occurs while evaluat-
ing another person, then it is puzzling why DMPFC is modulated
by self-evaluation to the same degree as the evaluation of a per-
son who is not personally known but assumed to be dissimilar to
the self. If this region of DMPFC indexes correction away from a
self-representation, why would this correction be engaged when
evaluating oneself?
An alternate conceptualization of why DMPFC is modulated by
self-other dissimilarity: certainty about the evaluation
Although it has not received much empirical attention, there is an
alternate mechanism which could explain the pattern of DMPFC
modulation found in these studies of self-evaluation and evalua-
tion of strangers. Research on evaluation in non-social domains
finds an association between DMPFC activation and greater cer-
tainty in evaluation (e.g., Krain et al., 2006; Bhanji et al., 2010;
Eldaief et al., 2012). An integration of the psychological research
on the interplay between self- and other-evaluation with the estab-
lished association between DMPFC and evaluation certainty sug-
gests that the DMPFC modulation found in paradigms involving
self-evaluation and evaluation of strangers is tracking certainty in
self-evaluation.
It has already been shown that certainty about one’s self-
evaluation modulates DMPFC activation (D’Argembeau et al.,
2012). Studies on self-referent processing ask participants to rate
the self-descriptiveness of personality traits and find that MPFC
activation (extending into the DMPFC) is increased to the extent
the traits are evaluated as self-descriptive (e.g., Moran et al., 2006;
D’Argembeau et al., 2012). A personality trait may be evaluated as
self-descriptive because people are certain about their association
with the trait or they may be motivated to see themselves as charac-
terized by that trait. One study delved further into these underlying
reasons and found that a region within DMPFC was modulated
by degree of certainty that the trait applied to self (D’Argembeau
et al., 2012).
DMPFC is associated with certainty about evaluation both for
non-social tasks and self-evaluation; but how can an increase in
certainty explain why DMPFC activation increases to the extent
we evaluate people who are dissimilar to the self? Wouldn’t we
be feeling uncertain when evaluating people we presume do not
share our own qualities? Psychological research finds that eval-
uations of dissimilar others elicits a spontaneous self-evaluation
and ironically solidifies our certainty about our own opinions and
attitudes. In fact, certainty about our own preferences increases
to the extent that the we perceive the target of our evaluation
to be dissimilar to ourselves (Holtz and Miller, 2001; Holtz and
Nihiser, 2008). In other words, this research suggests that rather
than using the self as an anchor for evaluating other people (i.e.,
self-projection), the evaluation of other people triggers a sponta-
neous self-evaluation. And the more we evaluate someone to be
different from us, the more we feel certain about where we stand on
that attribute. Therefore, the increasing DMPFC activation found
during a task that requires the evaluations of others could also be
indexing an aspect of concomitant, spontaneous self-evaluations.
Specifically, DMPFC activation may be modulated by increased
certainty about the self to the extent that the target of evaluation
is perceived as dissimilar to the self.
Implications of an association between DMPFC and certainty about
self-evaluation
If DMPFC modulation does reflect certainty in self-evaluation,
then a reconceptualization of self-evaluation localizer tasks may
be warranted. Some studies have used a self-referent processing
task (i.e., asking participants to rate their own personality traits
compared to rating the personality traits of a political figure) as a
way of localizing neural regions associated with self-processing for
subsequent tasks. Future research is needed to understand whether
this task identifies regions within DMPFC that index the intended
rich psychological aspects of self or simply certainty in evaluation
(i.e., on average, we are likely more certain about self-evaluation
than evaluation of a political figure only seen in the news).
VMPFC: SOCIOEMOTIONAL CONNECTION OR FIRSTHAND EXPERIENCE?
The correction of self-projection or certainty might explain the
contribution of DMPFC to social cognition but what about the
more ventral subdivision of MPFC (VMPFC) that is associated
with evaluations of self and intimate others (VMPFC is a label that
is used in various ways in previous literature; the present article
draws on published meta-analyses and uses the term VMPFC as
label for relevant portions of BA 10/32; z range −2 to 8, see
Figure 1, Ochsner et al., 2005; Qin and Northoff, 2011; Mur-
ray et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2012)? Two different hypotheses have
been proposed: the correction of self-projection (Mitchell et al.,
2005; Tamir and Mitchell, 2010) and self-relatedness (Northoff
et al., 2006; Krienen et al., 2010; Murray et al., 2012; Roy et al.,
2012). Currently, there is only mixed support for the correction
of self-projection perspective. The hypothesis that VMPFC may
mediate self-relatedness is more consistent with the available data
but more research is needed to unpack the psychological meaning
of self-relatedness.
VMPFC modulation and the correction of self-projection? current
studies find inconsistent associations
Unlike the DMPFC, VMPFC modulation has not shown a consis-
tent pattern of association with evaluations of others as function of
self-other dissimilarity (Mitchell et al., 2005; Krienen et al., 2010;
Tamir and Mitchell, 2010). For example, an initial study asked par-
ticipants to rate the preferences of unknown others (i.e., pleasure
at having their photograph taken: Mitchell et al., 2005). VMPFC
activation during the preference-evaluation task decreased to the
extent that the unknown others were evaluated as dissimilar to
the self in a post-scan procedure. Yet a follow-up analysis found
a different pattern: VMPFC activation did not show a parametric
association and it showed a positive (i.e., opposite) association to
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dissimilarity. VMPFC showed little change (in relation to base-
line) during evaluations of other people who were evaluated (to
any degree) as dissimilar from the self and a significant deac-
tivation (in relation to baseline) when evaluating similar others
(Tamir and Mitchell, 2011). It has been suggested that the dif-
ferent findings might indicate the existence of different neural
mediation for computing global vs. specific dissimilarity. Dissim-
ilarity was operationalized as a person’s global political affiliation
on the one hand (Mitchell et al., 2006) and trial-by-trial specific
preferences on the other (i.e., Tamir and Mitchell, 2010). How-
ever, another series of studies found no association at all between
VMPFC (BA 10) modulation and similarity between close others
or strangers (Krienen et al., 2010). This research instead found that
VMPFC shows increased activation for self-evaluations and evalu-
ations of close others (regardless of similarity) and less activation
for unknown others. Even if future research were to flesh out a
robust association between VMPFC modulation and evaluations
of dissimilar others, the correction of self-projection explanation
still suffers from a parallel set of problems mentioned above in
relation to DMPFC. Meta-analyses find that VMPFC activation is
modulated by both self-evaluation and evaluation of intimate oth-
ers (Ochsner et al., 2005; Qin and Northoff, 2011; Murray et al.,
2012). It is unclear why people would need to correct the use
of their self-representation when evaluating themselves or why
they would use a self-projection process to evaluate someone they
know well.
VMPFC modulation and self-relatedness of social evaluation: a
socioemotional or cognitive mechanism?
Another predominant hypothesis arising from current social eval-
uation research is that VMPFC marks “self-relatedness,” that is, the
socioemotional connection between the self and the person being
evaluated (Northoff et al., 2006; Krienen et al., 2010; Murray et al.,
2012; Roy et al., 2012). Self-relatedness is a socioemotional vari-
able reflecting the extent to which the evaluation process draws
on affectively rich, self-representations. Psychological models of
social evaluation suggest that self-representations may be acti-
vated by evaluations of close others but not for the same reason
as for unknown others. “Close others” are often defined by the
extent to which representations of those people are associated with
self-representations (Aron et al., 1992). It is not the case that the
self-representation is theorized to serve as a starting point for eval-
uating the close other (i.e., a self-projection-like process which is
then subject to correction). Instead, the evaluation of a close other
draws on a representation of the close other that is emotionally
charged because of its association with the self-representation.
From this perspective, VMPFC is modulated by self-evaluation
and evaluation of close others because those evaluations have a
unique affective or socioemotional significance.
However, it may not be that VMPFC marks whether social eval-
uations are “self-like” in a socioemotional sense. In the existing
research, socioemotional relation between the self and another
person has always been confounded with the quality of informa-
tion (e.g., cognitive representation) used to make an evaluation.
We simply have a different class of information to draw on when
we evaluate ourselves and people we actually know (e.g., greater
complexity, abstraction, actual experience) compared to unknown
others. A novel person and a romantic partner elicit different
emotional reactions but they also elicit different cognitive repre-
sentations. For both the self and romantic partners, there is a long
history of storing person information which creates a more elabo-
rated representation that includes both abstract and biographical
information when compared to representations that could be used
to evaluate someone who is relatively unknown (e.g., Sherman and
Klein, 1994; Kihlstrom et al., 2003). A brain region that indexes
one or more cognitive qualities that are emphasized in the repre-
sentations of people we know well (i.e., self, close other) would
also behave like the VMPFC across these social evaluation tasks
as reviewed above (i.e., similar modulation across self-evaluation
and evaluation of close others but less modulation for unknown
others: Ochsner et al., 2005; Krienen et al., 2010; Qin and Northoff,
2011; Murray et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2012). This raises the possibil-
ity that the contribution of VMPFC to social cognition is more a
cognitive (rather than affective) “self-relatedness.” From this per-
spective,VMPFC may mediate a quality of the kind of information
that feeds into self-evaluations that is also available for evaluations
of people we actually know (but not as much for unknown others).
EXPANDING BEYOND MPFC (BA 9/10/32): VACC (BA 25) AND
MOFC (BA 11) MEDIATE MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES ON
BOTTOM-UP AND TOP-DOWN PROCESSING OF SOCIAL
TARGETS
Despite the heavy focus on MPFC (BA 9/10/32), an emerging body
of literature suggests that at least two other midline regions are just
as important for social cognitive processing: VACC (BA 25) and
MOFC (BA 11) (see Figure 1). VACC and MOFC mediate moti-
vational aspects of self-processing. Motivation has been ascribed
a central role in psychological models of self-processing (Kunda,
1990; Robins and John, 1997). For example, self-evaluations tend
to be positively tinged (also described as “self-serving,”“the above
average effect,” “self-flattering,” “self-enhanced” “optimistic bias”:
Alicke, 1985; Taylor and Brown, 1988; Dunning et al., 1989;
Chambers and Windschitl, 2004). Self-evaluations are described
as positively tinged to the extent that they are more positive than
warranted by some other criterion and this positive slant may even
be pre-potent, that is, the default mode of self-evaluation (Beer,
2007). Cognitive load makes self-evaluation even more positively
tinged (Paulhus et al., 1989; Kruger, 1999; Koole and Dijkster-
huis, 2001; Lench and Ditto, 2008; Beer and Hughes, 2010; Beer
et al., 2013). Furthermore, the positive tinge of self-evaluation
is not circumscribed to the lab (Dunning et al., 2004). People
will wager money that their positively tinged views are accurate
(Williams and Gilovich, 2008), expect that other people will share
their positively tinged views (Hepper et al., 2011), and experience
different life trajectories based on the extent of their positive slant
(Robins and Beer, 2001). A positive tinge also pervades evalua-
tions of close others but is less evident in evaluations of unknown
others (Suls et al., 2002). A positive tinge may arise because peo-
ple use incomplete information when making a social evaluation
(e.g., using the first thing that comes to mind which happens to
be positive: Chambers and Windschitl, 2004). However, a positive
tinge can also arise from the motivation to cast oneself or a close
other in a positive light (i.e., self-flattery: Taylor and Brown, 1988;
Sedikides and Gregg, 2008). Despite the central role of motivation
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in psychological models of self- and person evaluation, neural
models of self-processing have paid little attention to motivation
(Beer, 2007, 2012a). Recent research that addresses this gap sug-
gests that (a) VACC may be modulated by opportunities that have
the potential to accomplish a motivated self-evaluation (i.e., moti-
vational influences on bottom-up processing) and (b) MOFC may
be modulated by the extent to which the motivation to cast oneself
in a positive light requires the adjustment of evaluation thresholds
across contexts (i.e., top-down processing).
VACC: MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES ON BOTTOM-UP PROCESSING
VACC may mediate bottom-up sensitivity to opportunities that
have the potential to affirm the way someone wants to evaluate
themselves; however, it does not predict whether the opportu-
nity will successfully lead to motivated self-evaluation (Moran
et al., 2006; Sharot et al., 2007; Beer and Hughes, 2010; Hughes
and Beer, 2012a). Social psychological theories of self- and other-
evaluation often characterize these evaluations in terms of the
contribution of bottom-up and top-down processes (e.g., Dun-
can, 1976; Shavelson and Bolus, 1982; Devine, 1989; Fiske and
Neuberg, 1990; Brown et al., 2001; Beer, 2012b). “Top-down” and
“bottom-up” are terms that are used widely, but somewhat differ-
ently across fields. In the case of motivated self-evaluation, these
terms can be used to distinguish between subjective and objective
construals of information. People may be motivated to see them-
selves in a particular way and, therefore, interpret information in
a top-down, subjective manner that ensures the information can
be used to accomplish a motivated self-evaluation. Or the motiva-
tion may affect the kind of information that is distinguished from
other kinds of information (i.e., the influence of the motivation
on relatively bottom-up processing: e.g., Brown et al., 2001).
The influence of motivation on relatively bottom-up process-
ing of information can be illustrated by the example of people
filling out an online dating profile who want to portray themselves
as especially athletic compared to other people. If people scan the
activities checklist with the goal of portraying themselves as espe-
cially athletic, then we predict that VACC will be modulated by
activities on the checklist that objectively involve sports vs. activ-
ities that reflect poorly on athleticism (e.g., watching television).
Similarly, someone with the goal of portraying themselves as artis-
tic would show greater VACC activation when reading checklist
activities that objectively involve artistic pursuits vs. all of the
other options. In this way, VACC activation is implicated in the
influence of motivation on bottom-up processing of the checklist
because VACC modulation distinguishes between opportunities
that are objectively consistent vs. inconsistent with the activated
motivation. VACC is not implicated in purely top-down process-
ing because research suggests that it would not predict the extent
to which someone claims to be especially involved in each sport
compared to other people (i.e., the success of the top-down goal of
portraying oneself as particularly athletic). In other words, VACC
modulation does not predict the extent to which the meaning or
interpretation of the checklist activities are subjectively construed
to fit with the activated motivation nor does it predict reported
self-evaluation on those checklist activities. Instead, we hypothe-
size that VACC is modulated by a preliminary and relatively more
bottom-up step of motivated evaluation: delineating the existence
of opportunities that objectively have the potential to cast yourself
in particular light.
VACC activation differentiates positive valence from negative
valence, especially for social targets we want to see in a positive
light
The distinction between opportunity for motivated evaluation and
success in motivated evaluation is important because they have
been conflated in the current literature (Beer, 2007, 2012a). It is
inappropriate to use the term “bias” (e.g., positively tinged) to
label a self-endorsement of a positive trait or likelihood of a pos-
itive future event. There is no way to know whether someone has
successfully achieved a positively tinged evaluation simply because
they are rating positive traits or future events as particularly self-
descriptive. The person may truly possess high levels of that trait
and be predisposed to a positive future or they may not. A response
can be characterized as “biased” or positively tinged (rather than
merely positive) when it is more positive than warranted by a
benchmark criterion (Beer, 2007, 2012b).
For example, one way that positively tinged self-evaluation has
been operationalized is the extent to which people inflate their
own standing when comparing themselves to other people (Taylor
and Brown, 1988; Chambers and Windschitl, 2004). This line of
research often asks participants to make social-comparative judg-
ments. That is, participants are asked to evaluate how much they
possess personality traits in comparison to their average peer (i.e.,
much less, about the same or much more than someone of the
same, age, community, education level, etc.). When participants’
social-comparison evaluations are averaged across hundreds of
personality traits, their average evaluation, by definition, should
be somewhere near the average peer benchmark. However, the
majority of people report having significantly higher levels of pos-
itive personality traits and significantly lower levels of negative
traits than their average peer (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Cham-
bers and Windschitl, 2004). In this social-comparison task, VACC
is modulated by the condition that includes positive personality
traits (compared to negative personality traits) but it does not pre-
dict the extent to which someone reports an overall significantly
more desirable personality in comparison to their average peer
(Beer and Hughes, 2010; Hughes and Beer, 2012a).
VACC has been implicated in the detection of emotionally
significant, that is, valenced information in a variety of tasks (com-
pared to non-valenced information: Bush et al., 2000). However,
research on social cognition has shown that VACC modulation
may differentiate between particular classes of valence depending
on motivational state. When people evaluate well-liked social tar-
gets (e.g., the self, romantic partner, well-liked roommate), VACC
activation differentiates trials where endorsement would portray
the target in a positive light (i.e., desirable personality traits, like-
lihood of a positive future) from trials where endorsement would
portray the target in a negative light (i.e., undesirable person-
ality traits, likelihood of a negative future: Moran et al., 2006;
Sharot et al., 2007; Beer and Hughes, 2010; Hughes and Beer,
2012a). However, when there is reduced motivation to portray
the target in a positive light (i.e., personality traits that are not
considered central to one’s self-view: Sedikides and Gregg, 2008; a
non-close other: Suls et al., 2002), VACC activation is less likely
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to differentiate trials on the basis of how endorsement would
portray the target (i.e., the self: Moran et al., 2006; an assigned col-
lege roommate: Hughes and Beer, 2012a). This research suggests
that VACC is important for identifying opportunities to portray
someone in a particular light but it does not predict whether the
opportunity actually leads to successful motivated evaluation.
Bottom-up sensitivity to information based on its potential to affirm
motivated self-evaluations: connectivity between VACC and MOFC
Psychophysiological interaction connectivity analyses (Friston
et al., 1997) conducted on previously published results (Beer and
Hughes, 2010) further supports the hypothesis that VACC (BA 25)
mediates a preliminary step but not the ultimate success of moti-
vated evaluation (for the full set of results, see Figure 2; Table 1).
Methods. Whole-brain PPI analyses were conducted in order to
investigate the functional connectivity of the VACC region that
differentiated social-comparative evaluations made in the Positive
condition from the social-comparative evaluations made in the
Negative condition (Beer and Hughes, 2010). Specifically, partici-
pants rated how much they had desirable (Positive condition) and
undesirable (Negative condition) personality traits in comparison
to their average peer. Imaging data were preprocessed using the FSL
software toolbox [Oxford Center for Functional Magnetic Reso-
nance Imaging (FMRIB); Smith et al., 2004]. Functional images
were motion corrected using MCFLRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002)
and non-brain structures were stripped from functional and struc-
tural volumes using the Brain Extraction Tool (BET; Smith, 2002).
Images were then smoothed (8 mm full-width half-maximum)
and normalized to MNI-152 space during preprocessing. Para-
meters for normalization into a standard space were obtained by
multiplying the transformation matrices across a two-step process
in which the functional images were registered to the MP-RAGE
FIGURE 2 | PPI connectivity analyses for theVACC seed associated
with social comparisons about Positive (i.e., desirable) vs. Negative
(i.e., undesirable) personality traits. (A) Each participant’s time series
was extracted from the VACC seed (5 mm radius sphere around group
peak: 14, 38, −4 from the Positive vs. Negative contrast, Beer and Hughes,
2010). (B)The VACC seed shows relatively more positive covariation with an
MOFC region. This MOFC region overlaps with the MOFC region that
regulates the extent to which social comparisons are positively tinged (red:
MOFC region found in PPI analyses; blue: MOFC region found in Beer and
Hughes, 2010; purple: overlap between MOFC region in connectivity and
primary analyses).
(6 DOF affine transformation), and the MP-RAGE was registered
to the MNI-152 template (12 DOF affine transformation).
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging analysis was per-
formed using FSL’s FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool version
5.98). A fixed-effects analysis modeled event related responses for
each participant. Responses made in the Positive and Negative con-
ditions were modeled as events using a canonical hemodynamic
response function with a temporal derivative. Motion regressors
were modeled as regressors of no interest. Each participant’s time
series was extracted from the VACC seed found in the group analy-
ses of the Positive vs. Negative condition (5 mm radius sphere
around group peak: 14, 38,−4 from the Positive vs. Negative con-
trast, Beer and Hughes, 2010). Two PPI regressors were created:
the interaction of the time series of the VACC seed with (a) the
time series of the Positive condition regressor and (b) the time
series of the Negative condition regressor.
A subsequent fixed-effects analysis was conducted modeling
the following regressors: (a) Positive condition regressor, (b) Neg-
ative condition regressor, (c) temporally filtered activity across the
time course from the VACC seed region, (d) PPI regressor for the
Positive condition, and (e) PPI regressor for the negative condi-
tion. The PPI regressors were contrasted in a GLM. A second-level
analysis created contrast estimates for each participant by collaps-
ing across the two runs, treating runs as a fixed effect. FEAT’s
FLAME module (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects; Smith
et al., 2004) was used to preformed mixed effects analysis which
created group average maps for contrasts of interest (p< 0.005,
uncorrected). The significance threshold was chosen because it
is the recommended threshold for striking an optimal balance
between Type I and Type II error when reporting analyses of brain
activation in relation to complex psychological processes; simu-
lation studies show that other significance thresholds raise the
possibility of Type II error beyond acceptable limits (Lieberman
and Cunningham, 2009). As the first report of functional connec-
tivity in relation to motivated self-evaluation, the goal was to be as
inclusive as reasonably possible to avoid missing true effects.
Results. When people make social comparisons about desirable
traits,VACC shows relatively more positive covariation with a por-
tion of MOFC (BA 11) that was found to regulate the extent to
which social-comparative evaluations are positively tinged in the
primary analyses. Although directionality cannot be determined
from PPI analyses, it is possible that VACC is involved in analyzing
the opportunities afforded by the content of an evaluation (i.e.,
a desirable trait vs. an undesirable trait). That information may
then be processed upstream by the MOFC before an evaluation is
expressed.
MOFC: MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES ON TOP-DOWN PROCESSING
As mentioned above, the MOFC is implicated in self-evaluation.
How should we conceptualize its role? Take the example men-
tioned earlier: people who view themselves as particularly athletic
complete an activity checklist on an online dating profile. Their
expectation may be met when they are able to endorse partic-
ipation in numerous sports on the checklist. But if they find
themselves able to only endorse involvement in just one or two
of the numerous sports possibilities, they may have one of two
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Table 1 | PPI connectivity analyses withVACC seed from data published in Beer and Hughes (2010).
Side Region of activation BA x y z z-stat No. of voxels
POSITIVE>NEGATIVE
Increased positive covariation L Lingual gyrus 18 −8 −48 −4 4.20 1463
L Postcentral gyrus 48 −52 −18 32 3.72 305
L Cerebellum 18 −26 −74 −20 3.33 212
R Medial orbitofrontal cortex 11 8 52 −10 3.40 123
R Supramarginal gyrus 48 56 −18 26 2.82 24
R Cerebellum 20 46 −38 −32 2.95 22
R Postcentral gyrus 2 46 −38 62 2.95 21
R Midcingulate 24 4 16 34 2.76 19
R Cerebellum 19 30 −78 −18 2.84 16
L Posterior cingulate 23 0 −22 40 2.76 15
Decreased positive covariation R Middle temporal gyrus 21 48 −48 12 3.53 1051
L Inferior temporal gyrus 20 −42 −18 −20 3.52 677
R Inferior temporal gyrus 20 62 −16 −24 4.03 427
R Inferior frontal gyrus 40, 11 26 28 −20 3.38 301
L Inferior temporal gyrus 37 −50 −52 −12 3.20 231
L Middle temporal gyrus 41 −44 −48 22 3.27 225
L Inferior parietal lobule 40 −54 −46 44 3.49 161
R Temporal pole 20 46 6 −36 3.07 113
R Fusiform 20 28 −6 −46 3.32 67
R Inferior temporal gyrus 20 70 −36 −20 3.08 65
L Middle temporal gyrus 21 −60 −36 0 3.08 64
R Parahippocampal gyrus 28 20 −4 −28 2.96 54
R Inferior temporal gyrus 36 38 −2 −28 2.86 49
L Superior frontal gyrus 8 −18 26 54 3.02 28
R Inferior frontal gyrus 48 36 24 12 3.00 23
R Middle temporal gyrus 39 52 −74 14 2.91 22
R Inferior frontal gyrus 45 62 30 12 2.91 15
L Putamen −26 8 4 2.71 15
L Insula 48 −30 12 12 2.88 12
possible reactions. If their self-esteem is not staked on their athletic
ability, they might realize that they are not so different from other
people in this regard. However, if the procedure threatens their self-
esteem, they may react defensively by changing their evaluation
threshold in such a way that they can evaluate themselves as having
even more superior athleticism. For example, they may evaluate
degree of athleticism based on the intensity of involvement in a
particular sport, rather than on the number of sports activities they
can endorse on the checklist. In one case, the initial expectation of
portraying oneself as athletic is dismissed during activity endorse-
ment (i.e., an initial top-down influence is controlled). In the case
where self-esteem is threatened, motivation to portray oneself in a
particular way exhibits a top-down influence on activity endorse-
ment by biasing the standards with which the evaluation is made.
MOFC modulation has been associated with both of the examples
above: realizing the self is not as special as expected and defensive
reactions when self-esteem is threatened. Connectivity analyses
suggest that MOFC modulation likely reflects different psycholog-
ical processes across these circumstances. In particular, a network
involving MOFC and (a) relatively more positive covariation with
striatum and (b) relatively less positive covariation with middle
frontal gyrus may aid self-evaluations that protect the self in the
face of self-esteem threat. However, MOFC activation found in
association with dismissing the influence of a self-evaluation moti-
vation does not show such connectivity. In this way, MOFC may
mediate top-down motivational influences on social evaluation by
supporting changes in evaluation standards to either facilitate or
control an activated motivational state.
When self-esteem is not at stake: OFC function is negatively
associated with positively tinged social evaluations
Both neuroimaging and lesion studies have shown that reduced
MOFC function is associated with positively tinged social evalua-
tions (i.e., self and close others: Beer et al., 2003; Beer et al., 2006a,
2010; Beer and Hughes, 2010; Hughes and Beer, 2012a). This rela-
tion holds across various operationalizations of self-flattery: the
difference in the way you see yourself compared to how others
view you, self-evaluation of task achievement compared to actual
task performance on an unimportant task, and base rates of social
comparisons.
A series of studies found that patients with OFC damage tend
to view their social behavior in a positively tinged manner (Beer
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et al., 2003, 2006a). In one study, patients with OFC damage were
socially disinhibited compared to healthy control participants yet
they expressed greater pride in their social behavior (i.e., inappro-
priate teasing of strangers: Beer et al., 2003). Another study found
that patients with OFC damage did not evaluate the appropriate-
ness of their social behavior any differently than healthy control
participants or participants with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) damage. Yet outside observers, blind to participant sta-
tus, rated the social behavior of the patients with OFC damage to
be significantly more inappropriate than the other groups (i.e., too
familiar for an interaction with a stranger: Beer et al., 2006a).
Neuroimaging results complement the lesion studies: reduced
OFC activation (BA 11) is associated with positively tinged evalua-
tions of one’s task performance and personality (Beer and Hughes,
2010; Beer et al., 2010; Hughes and Beer, 2012a). In one study, par-
ticipants estimated their confidence in their answers to a trivia task.
Reduced OFC activation (BA 11) predicted the extent to which par-
ticipants were overconfident about their incorrect trivia answers
(Beer et al., 2010). Reduced OFC activation also predicts the extent
to which people view themselves and their romantic partners to
have significantly more desirable personalities than their peers. As
mentioned above in the section on VACC function, these studies
ask participants to compare themselves or their romantic partners
to an average peer (i.e., a person who is the same gender, age, from
the same community, university campus, etc.). When these social-
comparative judgments of personality traits are averaged across
hundreds of traits, each participant (or their romantic partner)
should, by definition, be evaluated as comparable to their aver-
age peer. Whereas VACC activation showed no relation, reduced
OFC activation is associated with the extent to which people
evaluate themselves (Beer and Hughes, 2010) or their romantic
partners (Hughes and Beer, 2012a) to have significantly more pos-
itive traits and significantly fewer negative traits than their average
peer. Taken together, these studies provide robust evidence that
reduced OFC activation predicts positively tinged evaluations on
a trial-by-trial, condition, and individual difference basis.
The case of self-esteem defense: a positive association between
OFC activation and self-protection
There is an exception to the findings described above: increased
MOFC (BA 11) activation predicts self-evaluations in situations
where self-esteem comes under attack (Hughes and Beer, 2013).
Self-esteem is typically threatened when people receive nega-
tive feedback about their personality, academic abilities, or skills
(Baumeister et al., 1993; Leary et al., 1998; vanDellen et al.,
2011). People cope with self-esteem threat by inflating the pos-
itively tinged nature of their self-evaluation (including social
comparisons: Beer et al., 2013 and see vanDellen et al., 2011 for
review). The lesion and fMRI research reviewed above did not
include any manipulations to threaten self-esteem. What happens
to the underlying neural modulation when social-comparison
judgments are used to cope with self-esteem attack? In other
words, what neural regions mediate self-evaluations that are self-
flattering (e.g., positively tinged with the purpose of protecting
the self against a self-esteem threat)? One fMRI study addressed
this question by using the very same social-comparison evalua-
tion as a previous study (Beer and Hughes, 2010) but added in a
self-esteem threat manipulation (Hughes and Beer, 2013). Partici-
pants learned that other students had found them either likable or
unlikable and then evaluated how their personalities compared to
their peers. Consistent with previous research, evaluations made
after learning that others found them unlikable were even more
self-flattering (compared to learning that others found them lik-
able). The extent to which social comparisons became even more
self-flattering as a function of self-esteem attack was positively
associated with increased MOFC modulation (Hughes and Beer,
2013). Therefore, this study found that MOFC modulation pre-
dicted a change in self-evaluation but, in the case of self-esteem
attack, it shows a positive association with self-protection.
Although the studies on social comparison (Beer and Hughes,
2010; Hughes and Beer, 2013) provided a rigorous test of the
association between MOFC modulation and self-evaluation as a
function of self-esteem threat, they were not designed to pinpoint
the underlying psychological process that explained the associa-
tion. One study has begun to address this issue by using Signal
Detection Theory to investigate the neural associations of self-
evaluations used to protect one’s self-esteem (Hughes and Beer,
2012b). Just as people tend to inflate their social standing on
personality traits, they tend to claim knowledge about concepts
beyond what they actually know or could know (i.e., overclaim
knowledge: Paulhus et al., 2003; Beer et al., 2010). However, when
self-esteem is potentially at stake (i.e., their false claims could be
discovered), people reduce the extent to which they overclaim
knowledge (Paulhus et al., 2003) or inflate their social standing
on personality traits (McKenna and Myers, 1997). In conditions
where false claims would make them look foolish, people protect
their self-esteem by adopting a different standard (i.e., decision
threshold) for claiming knowledge which consequently reduces
overclaiming. An fMRI study found that MOFC (BA 11) mod-
ulation was positively associated with the shift toward a more
conservative standard in conditions where participants would look
foolish if they were to make false claims of knowledge (i.e., they
were warned that some concepts in the list did not exist: Hughes
and Beer, 2012b).
A top-down role of MOFC in social evaluation
Consistent with the hypothesis that self-evaluations used to cope
with self-esteem threat are distinct from self-evaluations made in
the absence of threat, a relatively consistent pattern of functional
connectivity emerged in the studies that investigated the impact
of self-esteem threat on self-evaluations (Hughes and Beer, 2012b,
2013) and was distinct from the pattern found in a parallel social-
comparison procedure that did not manipulate self-esteem threat
(Beer and Hughes, 2010, see Table 2).
Methods. Whole-brain PPI analyses were conducted in order to
investigate the functional connectivity of MOFC during social
comparisons in the presence and absence of self-esteem threat
from three previously published datasets (Dataset 1: Hughes and
Beer, 2013; Dataset 2: Hughes and Beer, 2012a; Dataset 3: Beer and
Hughes, 2010). For all three datasets, the preprocessing steps were
the same as described earlier for the PPI analyses of the VACC seed.
PPI analyses were conducted as follows. In Dataset 1 (Hughes and
Beer, 2013), participants made social-comparative evaluations of
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Table 2 | PPI connectivity analyses with MOFC seed*.
Side Region of activation BA Coordinates z-stat No. of voxels
x y z
ACCOUNTABLE (i.e.,THREAT)>UNACCOUNTABLE (Hughes and Beer, 2012b)
Increased positive covariation R Putamen 22 −10 6 2.75 13
Reduced positive covariation L Middle frontal gyrus 9 −24 52 30 2.82 12
THREAT>NOTHREAT (Hughes and Beer, 2013)
Increased positive covariation R Caudate 14 16 −10 2.75 22
Reduced positive covariation L Middle frontal gyrus 9 −22 30 46 2.76 21
L Middle frontal gyrus 44 −40 24 38 2.68 13
L Middle frontal gyrus 9 −30 32 40 2.61 9
SPECIFIC>BROAD (TRAIT BREADTH,THREAT NOT INCLUDED: Beer and Hughes, 2010)
Reduced positive covariation L Thalamus −14 −16 −4 3.18 112
L Superior frontal gyrus 10 −10 56 12 3.34 55
L Cerebellum −2 −60 −32 2.88 31
L Supramarginal gyrus 2 −58 −26 40 2.81 30
R Fusiform gyrus 20 36 −14 −30 3.08 20
L Superior temporal pole 38 −36 26 −30 2.98 18
L Superior temporal gyrus 38 −56 4 −10 2.79 14
R Fusiform 37 34 −66 −10 2.78 14
L Parahippocampal gyrus 37 −26 −36 −10 2.85 13
L Pallidum −24 −10 −4 2.77 10
L Fusiform 36 −32 0 −40 2.67 10
*No regions found for increased positive covariation in Beer and Hughes (2010).
their personality traits while the presence of self-esteem threat was
manipulated. In other words, participants evaluated how their per-
sonality traits compared to an average peer after just learning that
a majority of peers found them unlikable (Threat condition) or a
majority of peers found them likable (No Threat condition). As
previously published, increased MOFC activity is associated with
positively tinged evaluations of one’s personality in the Self-esteem
Threat condition (both a main effect and individual differences in
evaluations made in the Threat vs. No Threat condition: Hughes
and Beer, 2013). Each participant’s time series was extracted from
the MOFC seed (group peak: −12, 54, −14 from the Threat vs.
No Threat contrast, Hughes and Beer, 2012a). Two PPI regressors
were created: interaction of the time series of the MOFC seed with
(i) the time series of the Threat condition regressor and (ii) the
time series of the No Threat condition regressor.
In Dataset 2 (Hughes and Beer, 2012b), participants evalu-
ated their familiarity with blocks of information they believed
would make them appear intelligent while their awareness of
the exposure of fake claims was manipulated. Specifically, all
blocks of information contained items that existed and items
that do not exist but participants were only warned of the pos-
sibility of non-existent items in half of the blocks (Accountable
condition vs. an Unaccountable condition where they were not
warned that they might be claiming familiarity with something
that does not exist). Increased MOFC activity was associated with
the shift toward a more conservative standard for claiming knowl-
edge in the Accountable condition. Each participant’s time series
was extracted from the MOFC seed (5 mm radius sphere around
group peak: −6, 58, −20 from the Accountable vs. Not Account-
able contrast; Hughes and Beer, 2012b). Two PPI regressors were
created: interaction of the time series of the MOFC seed with (i)
the time series of the Accountable condition regressor and (ii) the
time series of the Not Accountable condition regressor.
In Dataset 3 (Beer and Hughes, 2010), participants made the
same social-comparative evaluations of their personality traits as
in Dataset 1 but self-esteem threat was not manipulated. Instead,
the breadth of personality traits were manipulated such that they
could either be broadly construed (i.e., Broad condition: trait has
a wide variety of behavioral manifestations such as “capable”) or
more specifically construed (i.e., Specific condition: trait has few
behavioral manifestations such as “talkative”). Reduced MOFC
activity was associated with viewing the self as having more pos-
itive and fewer negative traits in comparison to the average peer
(i.e., positively tinged evaluations of one’s personality). Each par-
ticipant’s time series was extracted from the MOFC seed (5 mm
radius sphere around group peak: −4, 46, −10 from the Specific
vs. Broad contrast; Beer and Hughes, 2010). Two PPI regressors
were created: interaction of the time series of the MOFC seed with
(i) the time series of the Specific condition regressor and (ii) the
time series of the Broad condition regressor.
After PPI regressors were created, all of the datasets were sub-
jected to a subsequent fixed-effects analyses in the same man-
ner as described earlier for the PPI analyses of the VACC seed.
Specifically, the fixed-effects analyses to modeled condition of
interest regressors (i.e., Dataset 1: Threat and No Threat con-
ditions (Hughes and Beer, 2013; Dataset 2: Accountable and
Unaccountable conditions (Hughes and Beer, 2012b; Dataset 3:
Specific and Broad conditions (Beer and Hughes,2010),a temporal
filter of activity across the time course from the MOFC seed region,
and the PPI regressors for conditions of interest. The PPI regressors
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were contrasted in a GLM. FEAT’s FLAME module (FMRIB’s Local
Analysis of Mixed Effects; Smith et al., 2004) was used to pre-
form mixed effects analyses for each dataset, which created group
average maps for contrasts of interest (p< 0.005, uncorrected).
Results. PPI connectivity analyses (Friston et al., 1997) con-
ducted on previously published results (Beer and Hughes, 2010;
Hughes and Beer, 2012b, 2013) suggest that functional connectiv-
ity between MOFC, the striatum, and the middle frontal gyrus (BA
9) may support self-evaluations used to protect self-esteem in the
face of threat (see Figure 3; Table 2). When self-esteem is at stake,
the region of MOFC that is associated with self-evaluation shows
relatively less positive covariation with middle frontal gyrus (BA
9) and relatively greater positive covariation with striatum. It is
possible that functional connectivity between MOFC and striatal
subregions reflects whether a shift to more conservative or liberal
evaluation standards will be most rewarding in the face of self-
esteem threat. For example, greater positive covariation between
MOFC and caudate was found when liberal thresholds were
advantageous for protecting self-esteem (Hughes and Beer, 2013)
and between MOFC and putamen when conservative thresholds
were advantageous for protecting self-esteem (Hughes and Beer,
2012b). Taken together, this research suggests that MOFC aids
top-down influences on social cognition by adjusting evaluation
standards as function of motivational state.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR
RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF MPFC, VACC, AND MOFC IN
SELF-EVALUATION
While much progress has been made since the discovery in the
early 2000s that MPFC is associated with self-evaluation, several
hypotheses have been tested and eliminated. The new hypotheses
described here will benefit from future research guided by a num-
ber of questions. For example, even though MPFC has received
the bulk of attention, there are still many questions that remain. It
would be extremely useful (and feasible) to conduct connectivity
analyses on the large, existing body of studies that have measured
MPFC modulation in relation to both self-evaluation and the
evaluation of unknown others. One potential drawback of the
“correction of self-projection” hypothesis for both VMPFC and
DMPFC is that these regions are activated for evaluation of
targets where correction of self-projection is unlikely (e.g., self
and/or close others). If the functional connectivity of VMPFC
and DMPFC is different during self-evaluation compared to eval-
uations of unknown others, those results would eliminate some
concerns about the correction of self-projection hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, more research is needed to decouple the affective vs.
cognitive qualities shared by evaluation of the self and close
others to more clearly delineate the role of VMPFC in social
evaluation. If VMPFC is similarly modulated by the evaluation
of another person where there is an emotional association with
the self but no actual firsthand experience or basis for self-
projection, then that would be strong evidence that VMPFC
indexes the emotional aspect of self-relatedness when evaluating
other people.
Additionally, more research is needed to clarify the possibil-
ity that VACC is involved in detecting opportunities that might
fulfill expectations about self-evaluation. Does VACC mediate
sensitivity to motivationally consistent information or positively
valenced information when it is motivationally consistent? This
question is important because psychological models show that
motivation to see oneself in a positive light is not the only
motivation that impacts self-evaluation. For example, the rela-
tion between valence and motivation becomes uncoupled when
self-verification, another motivation known to influence self-
evaluation, is activated. People often want to feel that their self-
evaluations are correct and are vigilant for opportunities that have
the potential to verify their current self-evaluations. In fact, this
research finds that people with negative self-evaluations desire
chances to confirm these negative self-evaluations (Swann et al.,
1989). In this situation, the evaluation of negative traits (rather
than positive traits) would have the potential to affirm moti-
vated self-evaluation. If VACC mediates sensitivity to motiva-
tionally consistent information, then it should be modulated by
FIGURE 3 | PPI connectivity analyses for the MOFC seed associated
with self-protection in the face of self-esteem threat. (A) MOFC seed
regions for connectivity analyses of previously published studies (5 mm
radius spheres around group peak). Dark green seed: social comparisons
while under Threat vs. No Threat contrast, group peak −12, 54, −14
(Dataset 1: Hughes and Beer, 2013). Light green seed: claims of
knowledge while Accountable vs. Not Accountable contrast, group peak:
−6, 58, −20 (Dataset 2: Hughes and Beer, 2012b). (B)When false claims
of knowledge could be discovered, the MOFC seed associated with
self-protection (i.e., less inflated claims) shows relatively more positive
covariation with the right putamen (22, −10, 6) and less positive
covariation with the left middle frontal gyrus (BA 9; −24, 52, 30). (C)When
self-esteem was threatened, the MOFC seed associated with more
self-flattering evaluations shows relatively more positive covariation with
the right caudate (14, 16, −10) and less positive covariation with the
middle frontal gyrus (BA 9).
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opportunities to affirm a negative self-evaluation for people who
are motivated to confirm a negative self-view. Furthermore, more
research is needed to replicate and understand the psychological
significance of the connectivity between VACC, MOFC and the
other regions found in the PPI analyses.
Finally, more research is needed to replicate and elucidate
the functional connectivity of MOFC in association with self-
evaluations made in the presence and in the absence of self-esteem
threat. While there is convergent evidence that more positive
covariation with striatum and reduced covariation with mid-
dle frontal gyrus is associated with self-evaluation used to pro-
tect self-esteem, much less is understood about the significance
of regions that covary with MOFC modulation associated with
self-evaluations made in the absence of self-esteem threat.
In conclusion, a new framework is proposed to account for
the contribution of MPFC, VACC, and MOFC to social cognition.
MPFC is broadly implicated in self-evaluation but may be char-
acterized by a ventral to dorsal division when evaluating others
based on their intimacy. Certainty about evaluation may better
characterize the contribution of DMPFC to social cognition than
the correction of self-projection. The association between VMPFC
and self-relatedness will be clearer once future research disentan-
gles shared emotional and cognitive properties of evaluation of
self and close others. Further, previous research has failed to take
into account the fundamental role that motivation has in self-
evaluations. As a result, the role of VACC and MOFC in social
cognition has been obscured until recently. VACC may mediate
bottom-up sensitivity to information based on its potential for
helping us evaluate ourselves and others the way we want. MOFC
may mediate top-down motivational influences on self-evaluation.
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